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Private Banknotes in Canada from 1867 (and
Before) to 1950
Muharem Kianieff
This article outlines the legal and historical experience of the rise and fall of privately issued
paper money in Canada against the backdrop of the development ofpaper currency in Europe,
and it reviews the reasons why the right to issue currency was ultimately transferred from
private banks to the Bank of Canada. The article opens with a discussion of the monetary
regime that developed in Europe and was imported into Canada well before Confederation.
The value of medieval coins was based on the value of the precious metals in them, and
fluctuations in the price of those metals led to a chronic shortage ofsmall-denomination coins.
Expanding commerce required a reliable money supply, and that need was gradually met by
private notes issued by goldsmiths and banks. In pre-Confederation Canada, problems with the
supply of money also led to the issuing ofprivate notes, first by merchants and then by newly
established banks. From Confederation to the 1930s, federal banking and finance legislation
tried to come to grips with the needfor a secure currency andfor the expansion of credit, but
with only limited success. The financial system's failure to respond adequately to the challenges
of the Depression led to the establishment of the Bank of Canada in 1935, over the obiections of
many private bankers. The legislation that set up the Bank of Canada provided for the gradual
phasing out ofprivate banknotes and their replacement by notes issued by the Bank of Canada.
The events that led to the move away from privately issued currency, and to the advent of a
central bank, played an important role in helping to shape the economy of the young country.
A review of the historical record casts doubt on the views of economists who have arguedfor a
return to a system ofprivately issued currency, and it can provide guidance to those responsible
for formulating policies to meet our currency needs in tbe future.
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Introduction
Canadians today take for granted the fact that this country's official
currency is the dollar, as manifested in the familiar banknotes of the
Bank of Canada-our central bank. Yet not so long ago, Canada's
monetary system was based on banknotes issued by the chartered banks.
Each chartered bank issued notes that could be redeemed for coins or
precious metal in various centres across the country. From 1867 to 1950,
these notes competed with each other and complemented the officially
issued governmental currency, the Dominion Note.
Periodically, one finds proposals for the elimination of the
governmental monopoly over currency issuance, in the hope that the
monetary system might be restored to what it was before that
monopoly came about. The most famous of those proposals, perhaps,
was that of the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek in his 1976 book,
Denationalisation of Money.' Hayek argued that the economic system
would be much more efficient, and the political system less totalitarian,
if currencies were to be supplied by the private sector rather than by
government.2 Historical experience suggests that such theories bring
with them an element of risk. I have commented elsewhere on the
1. Friedrich A. Hayek, Denationalisation ofMoney: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice
of Concurrent Currencies (Lancing, U.K.: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976).
2. Ibid.
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wisdom of similar theories with respect to Internet currencies, which in
many ways are similar to private banknotes.3 The purpose of this paper
is to examine the historical record on the Canadian experience with
private banknotes, and the circumstances surrounding the abandonment
of that experience.
Part One of this paper will discuss the operation of the monetary
system as a function of the gold standard and the standard formula. Part
Two will focus on the operations of the money supply mechanism from
Confederation to the establishment of the Bank of Canada, when the
issuing of private notes reached its zenith. Part Three will discuss events
surrounding the Bank's establishment, and Part Four will describe the
impact of the nationalization of the money supply mechanism on
subsequent events.
I. The Money Supply as a Function of the
Standard Formula and the Gold Standard
During the medieval era, states and individuals throughout Europe
believed in a system of full-bodied coinage.4 Under that system, the
denominations of coins were based on their intrinsic value, which
would fluctuate with the value of the metal from which they were
minted and also with the exchange rate between different
denominations. While today the value of a quarter is fixed relative to the
value of a nickel despite the present valuation of the dollar, under a full-
bodied coinage system the purchasing power of a coin would vary vis-a'-
vis that of other denominations as well. For instance, under the present
system, a quarter is the equivalent of five nickels, but under a full-bodied
coinage system, it could be worth six nickels if its purchasing power
were to increase or if the purchasing power of the nickel were to
decrease. One of the perceived benefits of a full-bodied coinage system
was that price levels could be anchored to the value of precious metals.
3. Muharem Kianieff, "Show Me the Money! A Critical Evaluation of Laissez-Faire
Internet Currencies" (2002) 17 B.F.L.R. 215.
4. Thomas J. Sargent & Frangois R. Velde, The Big Problem of Small Change (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002) at 5.
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The medieval solution to providing a workable medium of exchange
was to emphasize the role of money as a standard of value and as a
metallic store of value. Money was both a means of facilitating
transactions and a means of investment. The supply of coins of each
denomination would be determined by private citizens, who would use
precious metals to purchase coins from the mints at prices set by
government.5 Government would not mandate the quantity of each
denomination that was to be minted. On the contrary, individuals could
bring or purchase specie (in the form of bullion, or old or worn coins)
to or at a mint and have it coined in whatever denomination they
wished. In doing so, they would have to think carefully of the rate of
return to be derived from minting a particular denomination of a coin.
Mints were private operations which, in exchange for brassage6 and
seignioragel fees, stood ready to mint coins that were demanded by the
public. The propensity to mint a particular coin was determined by the
general price level and the value of a precious metal. Thus, when the
price level was low with respect to a particular denomination of a coin,
the officially declared value of the coin (and hence its rate of return)
would be high enough that people would bring metal to the mints to be
coined. Analogously, the mint price (that is, the cost of the metal plus
the mint fees) would be low for an individual, so it would be profitable
to have a coin minted. Conversely, a high price level would diminish
the mint price of a coin, so it would bring a higher rate of return as
bullion or as some other denomination. Individuals would thus decrease
their holdings of coins in a manner that minimized transaction costs.
The end result was that individuals melted, exported or hoarded coins as
the cheapest way of obtaining the metal.'
The system ultimately proved to be problematic, since it suffered from
persistent shortages of smaller denominations throughout most of
5. ibid.
6. Sargent and Velde define brassage as a "[flee charged by the mint operator to cover
production costs (excluding the price of metal)." Ibid. at 375.
7. Sargent and Velde define seigniorage as a "[flee charged on the coining of money to
cover production costs and to provide revenue to the King. Also, profit earned by the
monetary authority from the issue of currency." Ibid. at 376.
8. Leland B. Yeager, Book Review of The Big Problem of Small Change [supra note 4],
(2002) 22 Cato J. 188 at 189.
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Europe. People would only wish to convert metal into coins if it was
profitable for them to do so.9 This in turn was a function of the price
level, which was determined by the aggregate stock of currency and not
just that of small denominations." As stocks of precious metals
gradually grew through increased mining activity, so would the price
level. The increase in the stocks of metal did not affect the mint price of
small coins in such a way as to make it profitable to mint them. In other
words, their scarcity still did not result in a rate that made it
advantageous for individuals to mint them in small denominations." As
a result, the relative purchasing power of small coins would result in
their depreciation vis-a-vis larger coins (and hence in their rate of return
as well). Small coins would thus become more valuable as metal than as
coins, and they would eventually be melted, which of course made the
situation even worse. 2 The initial solution of the medieval monetary
authorities was to debase 3 smaller coins in an effort to reverse this
trend, albeit temporarily. Over time, as prices continued to rise, an
increasing number of smaller denominations would be hoarded and
would eventually fall into disuse.
The economist Carlo Cipolla described this phenomenon, which
persisted from 1300 to 1850, as "the big problem of the petty coins,"14 or
in Sargent and Velde's words, "the big problem of small change." The
solution to it emerged in the form of what Cipolla termed the "standard
formula, " " which worked as follows. Small change was issued on
government account, with small coins having a commodity value lower
than their monetary value. Thus, unlike full-bodied coinage, those coins
were intrinsically of a token nature. The quantity of small coins in
9. Sargent & Velde, supra note 4 at 10.
10. Ibid
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Sargent and Velde define debasement as a "lowering of the intrinsic content of a coin
or currency." Ibid. at 375.
14. Carlo M. Cipolla, Money, Prices and Civilization in the Mediterranean World: Fifth to
Seventeenth Century (New York: Gordian Press, 1956).
15. This formula found its first formal expression in a memorandum from Sir Henry
Sligsby, Master of the London Mint, to King Charles I in 1661. Sargent & Velde, supra
note 4 at 13.
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circulation was limited, and they were kept convertible with one
another at fixed rates with the definitive money (which was to be full-
bodied gold coins that would emerge under the gold standard discussed
below).' 6 To use a current example, one can be confident that although a
quarter is of little intrinsic value, it will remain freely exchangeable for
two dimes and a nickel regardless of the value of the dollar. Thus while
full-bodiedness was eliminated for all purposes with respect to small
change, prices were still anchored to commodities while the gold
standard was in operation.
A. Banks ofDeposit, Goldsmiths and Banks of Circulation
Before we examine the implementation of the standard formula, it
may be helpful to pause and examine some of the other attempts to
address the "big problem of small change." Such solutions manifested
themselves in the development of institutions that were the precursors
to the modern banking system. In the twelfth century, the City of
Venice founded its first "bank of deposit," 7 a bank whose sole task was
to accept the gold and silver deposited with it for safekeeping, subject to
a fee.' 8 The Bank of Venice attained such credibility in the eyes of its
customers that many of the local merchants began to settle their mutual
claims through transfers on its books.'9 Its operations eventually came
to encompass accepting deposits and effecting payment of bills of
exchange and contracts between individuals.2" A remarkable facet of the
Bank of Venice was that although it was an institution without capital,
its bank credits commanded a premium in current money.2 ' It continued
in existence until 1797, when invading French armies overthrew the
16. Cipolla, supra note 14 at 27.
17. George Tucker, The Theory of Money and Banks Investigated (New York: A.M.
Kelley, 1964) at 145. The text was first published in 1839.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. at 146.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
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government, extinguished the debt of the state and annihilated the
bank.22
After Holland's independence, Dutch merchants founded a similar
bank in Amsterdam in 1609 for commercial purposes. 23 Like the Bank
of Venice, it was a bank of deposit. The problem of small change had
frustrated the attempts of local merchants to pay bills of exchange
drawn on them in good coin, so the value of those bills was depreciated
in the market.24 The Amsterdam bank operated under the guarantee of
the city, as was also the case in Venice. The bank would receive light
and worn coins then in circulation, and would give a credit on the
bank's books at or near their intrinsic value (approximately 95 percent
of their current value)- 25
This meant that the bank would absorb the risk in settling transactions
in underweight or clipped coins.26 Citizens could now settle transactions
between them by going to the bank together, presenting a deposit
receipt (or recepipe, as they were called), and ordering the bank to
transfer an amount from the debtor's to the creditor's account.
Amounts paid in this way were said to have been paid in "bank
money." 27 Depositors were authorized to make withdrawals within six
months for the amount of the coins deposited, if they had transferred to
the bank as much bank money as the depositor had received and if they
paid the costs for the keeping of specie.28 The rates charged were one
fourth of one percent for silver and one half of one percent for gold.
This provided an incentive for individuals not to convert their bank
credits back into coin, and the end result was that all of the money
deposited became the property of the bank.29
Eventually, the Amsterdam bank extended its deposit-taking activities
to include accepting deposits of bullion.3" Over time, receipts for these
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. at 147.
25. Ibid.
26. William A. Scott, Money and Banking, 4th ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 1910) at 106.
27. Tucker, supra note 17 at 148.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. at 149.
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deposits began to circulate as money, becoming a defacto paper currency
that could shield merchants from the risks of coins. Much of the success
of the bank has been attributed to the high levels of public confidence
that it inspired, because of the fact that all deposits were backed by one
hundred percent reserves of coins and bullion. By the 1790's, however,
the public's confidence was shaken when the bank's directors admitted
to lending the Dutch East India Company funds that it would not
repay.31 The bank's operations were thus curtailed, and in 1814 a bank
of circulation replaced it.
3 2
In seventeenth century England, paper money became prominent
because it allowed debtors to avoid the physical delivery of coins to
creditors.33 Goldsmiths are said to have pioneered paper money. They
would issue receipts in favour of a payee or bearer for funds deposited
with them.34 These receipts, known as goldsmiths' or bankers' notes,
were the precursor to the promissory note.35 Depositors were also
permitted to draw upon the goldsmith amounts up to the total amount
of the deposit.36 Drafts of this sort, which were payable on demand and
made out to a payee or bearer, were the first cheques.37 As Benjamin
Geva has observed, they came to serve as money themselves, with their
acceptability being based upon the credit of the issuer, irrespective of
the form of the instrument.3" The development of goldsmiths' notes
may have served as the impetus for banks to attempt to provide another
solution to the problem of small change.
31. Ibid. at 154.
32. Ibid. at 155.
33. Benjamin Geva, "From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History-On
Commerce, Tyranny, and the Modern Law of Money" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 115
at 146.
34. Richard David Richards, The Early History of Banking in England (New York: A.M.
Kelley, 1965) at 40-43. The text was first published in 1929
35. James Milnes Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (London:
Athlone Press, 1955) at 70.
36. Geva, supra note 33 at 146.
37. Holden, supra note 35 at 204.
38. Geva, supra note 33 at 146.
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"Banks of circulation" first gained prominence in the United States,
having originally been based on a model developed in Britain.39 Unlike
banks of deposit, they issued paper that was used as a circulating
medium.' The principal operations of a bank of circulation consisted of
lending money on the credit of promissory notes and bills of exchange
not yet due, after deducting or "discounting" the interest.41 When a
holder of a negotiable paper that was not yet due wished to cash the
instrument, the holder would be offered specie or the notes of the bank,
less interest. Banks of circulation would freely offer to convert their
notes for specie, so as to maintain public confidence in their issue. Such
confidence was crucial for these banks, as their profitability depended
on the extent of their loans, for which the substitution of paper for coin
was essential. They also maintained deposit facilities, and offered all of
the advantages of a bank of deposit.42
Banks of circulation had to be careful to retain enough specie to meet
public demands for redemption. Any initial endowments of specie that
constituted their reserves were often provided by the capital that was
paid into the bank by the original promoters, as specified in the bank's
charter. 43 Banks of circulation had an incentive to ensure that their notes
enjoyed wide circulation, so that they would take a long time to return
to the bank." Preference was thus given to customers who would accept
the bank's notes rather than specie in exchange for their negotiable
instruments. 4' A positive balance of trade led to freer discounting by the
banks, since it brought an influx of specie into the economy, which
could be used to secure outstanding notes.4 6
Throughout the eighteenth century, the use of banknotes as a form of
freely negotiable currency gained wide acceptance as a primary feature
of a bank of circulation. As early as 1758 in the United Kingdom, courts
began to treat private banknotes as a widely accepted form of money. In
39. Scott, supra note 26 at 160.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. at 161.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid. at 165.
44. Ibid. at 163.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
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the famous case of Miller v. Race,47 Lord Mansfield stated the following
with respect to banknotes:
Now they are not goods, not securities, nor documents for debts, nor are so esteemed:
but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary course and transaction of business, by
the general consent of mankind; which gives them the credit and currency of money, to
all intents and purposes. They are as much money, as guineas themselves are; or any
other current coin, that is used in common payments, as money or cash.48
An Irish case suggested that, in addition to the accepting of deposits
and the honouring of cheques, the issuing of notes was one of the
primary components of the business of banking, although it did not in
itself give rise to a banker-customer relationship.4 9 The extension of
banknotes was a sub-function of lending, as it was the primary way for a
bank to place credit in the hands of individuals.
The establishment of banks of circulation was thought to bring
considerable economic gain to the colonial economies of North
America. For much of its early history, North America had a trade
deficit with Europe, as it had to import many necessities. Thus, what
little currency there was in a colony was frequently sent back to the
mother country to pay for imports. A bank of circulation brought with
it the ability to supplement the money supply by offering credit.5"
Through prudently managed reserve banking, this credit could be used
to stimulate industry and meet consumer demand by employing the
"idle capital" of an economy. This was a precursor to what we today
refer to as expansionary monetary policy. The fact that banks had to
maintain public confidence in their issues, and thus had to anchor them
to specie, was seen as a beneficial check on the growth of the money
supply. The system was seen to provide a "flexible" means of adjusting
the money supply to the needs of the economy.
47. Miller v. Race (1758), 1 Burr. 452, 97 E.R. 398 (K.B.).
48. Ibid. at 457.
49. Shields and Others v. The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland, [1901] 1 I.R.
172 (Ch.).
50. Scott, supra note 26 at 181.
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B. Monetary Conditions in Canada before the Development of a Banking
System and the Emergence of the Bank of Montreal
Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Canada
also suffered from a persistent lack of coinage. s As explained above, an
adverse balance of trade meant that specie would not stay in Canada for
long. Numerous solutions were devised by the colonial authorities,
including the famous example of playing card money that was issued in
New France. 2 The presence of foreign coins alleviated some of the
difficulties, but did not adequately augment the money supply. British
coins used in Canada were imported from London or Birmingham, as
Canada had not been allowed to mint coins in its own right from the
bullion it possessed.53 The Ottawa branch of the Royal Mint did not
open until 1908. 5'
The lack of a viable means of exchange, and the disadvantages of the
barter economy, led to the development of new forms of payment.5 In
Canada, merchants began to issue their own paper notes, or "bons" as
they were called in Lower Canada, to their customers.5 6 The name came
from the fact that the notes would state that they would be "bon
pour"-specifying the amount of the note. 7 They could be redeemed in
goods from the store of issue, and would also pass from hand to hand. 8
They provided a crucial means of exchange between merchants and
their suppliers. The War of 1812 brought a governmental currency (the
51. R. Craig Mclvor, Canadian Monetary, Banking and Fiscal Development (Toronto:
MacMillan, 1961) at 17.
52. Ibid. at 1-11.
53. Emilio S. Binavince & H. Scott Fairley, "Banking and the Constitution: Untested
Limits of Federal Jurisdiction" (1986) 65 Can. Bar Rev. 328 at 335.
54. Ottawa, Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Currency in Canada
(Ottawa: King's Printer, 1933) (Chair: Lord Macmillan) [Macmillan Commission Report]
at 23. The Mint in Ottawa continued in operation as a branch of the Royal Mint until
1931, when it was taken over by the Canadian government and became a branch of the
Department of Finance.
55. Geva, supra note 33 at 122-123.
56. Mclvor, supra note 521 at 15.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
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Army Bills),59 which also provided relief. Although those bills were
taken out of circulation after the war, 60 the experience with them was
positive because it did much to dispel prejudice against paper money. 61
In the years after the War of 1812, the lack of adequate money supplies
coupled with the lack of banking facilities meant that the extension of
credit in Canada was largely in the hands of merchants.62 Although bons
were gaining widespread use, barter was still quite prominent, with
whisky often serving as a means of exchange. 63 As a result, in 1817, nine
Montreal merchants signed Articles of Association to conduct (without
statutory authority) a banking business that would come to be known as
the Bank of Montreal."4 Largely modelled on the First Bank of the
United States,65 the Bank of Montreal was envisaged as a bank of
discount, deposit and issue-a defacto bank of circulation. 66 It obtained
its Charter in 1822,67 and its Articles of Association served as a template
for subsequent banking institutions in Canada.68
59. One of the legacies of these experiences is that common parlance now refers to paper
money as "dollar bills." See Binavince & Fairley, supra note 53 at 335.
60. Mclvor, supra note 51 at 19-21.
61. Ibid. at 25.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. at 17.
64. Ibid. at 25.
65. This was the United States' first attempt to set up a central bank to perform the
same functions carried out by the Bank of England at the time. The Bank was the result
of a proposal made by Alexander Hamilton in 1791, the first Secretary of the Treasury.
Political opposition eventually resulted in its demise in 1811. A second Bank of the
United States, founded in 1817, met the same fate as its predecessor in 1837. The U.S.
Federal Reserve System, a third attempt at a central banking institution, was founded in
1914. See generally A. Barton Hepburn, A History of Currency in the United States, rev.
ed. (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1967).
66. Mclvor, supra note 51 at 25-26.
67. Ibid. at 26. The Charter was obtained from the Crown, although it was in essence an
act of incorporation by the legislature. The granting of a charter would change the official
status of the bank from a private to a public company, impose legally enforceable
obligations on its directors and greatly enhance its prestige as a centre for deposits and the
issuing of notes. Merrill Denison, Canada's First Bank: A History of the Bank of
Montreal (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966) vol. 1 at 136.
68. Ibid.
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Shortly after its founding, the Bank of Montreal sent one of its first
officers to New York to study the operations of the Bank of the United
States,69 which was held in high esteem throughout the world as a stable
institution that furthered the commercial interests of its constituency.0
The Bank of Montreal's first banknotes and the plates used to print
them also came from the United States.7
To build goodwill among the population, the Bank of Montreal had to
convince prospective customers that its activities would be beneficial to
the economy as a whole. The bank's directors were particularly keen to
obtain a charter, as that would reassure the public of the "beneficial
purposes contemplated by the Bank's establishment." 72 A central feature
of the Charter of the Bank of Montreal was its explicit reference to the
public interest: "Whereas the establishment of a Bank at the City of
Montreal, by legislative authority, would be conducive to the
advancement of Agriculture and Commerce, and promote the
prosperity of this Province."73
The extension of bank charters came to be seen as a powerful
regulatory tool to ensure that banks established in Canada met certain
liquidity standards and protected the interests of noteholders. The
public nature of the bank charter was manifested in subsequent versions
of the Bank Act, and helped to entrench the state's interest in the
business of banking. To obtain a charter, other banks would have to
meet legislatively mandated standards designed to safeguard the public
interest. 74
69. Adam Shortt, Adam Shortt's History of Canadian Currency and Banking 1600-1880
(Toronto: Canadian Bankers' Association, 1986) [Shortt, Adam Shortt's History] at 73.
70. Adam Shortt, 'Origin of the Canadian Banking System" in E.P. Neufeld, ed., Money
and Banking in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964) 77 at 83.
71. Shortt, Adam Shortt's History, supra note 69 at 73.
72. Roeliff Morton Brackenridge, The Canadian Banking System 1817-1890 (Baltimore:
Guggenheimer, Weil, 1895) at 26.
73. E.P. Neufeld, "Charter of the Bank of Montreal" in Neufeld, supra note 70 at 53.
74. Speaking of conditions some years later, an American writer said: 'The provisions of
the Bank Act with respect to the organization of new banks are intended to guard against
the entry of unfit or inexperienced persons into the banking business." Joseph French
Johnson, The Canadian Banking System (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910)
at 18.
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The Bank of Montreal proved to be successful, and gave rise to the
establishment of other banks throughout the country. As well as
providing for the extension of credit, the advent of banks of circulation
and the subsequent emergence of the banknote system conferred other
benefits. The convenience of no longer having to deliver specie to pay
debts helped to facilitate commerce. Perhaps more important, the
banknote system brought increased stability, since banknotes were more
widely accepted than merchant-issued bons. A bank's financial standing
was seen as more certain than that of a merchant or an individual. For
the same reason, banknotes gained more acceptance than cheques;75 a
banknote is a promise to pay, whereas a cheque is merely an order. 76
The emergence of banknotes ultimately led to a preference for chartered
banks over free banks, and thus to increased efforts to obtain
governmental charters by banks throughout British North America.
C. Implementation of the Standard Formula
While the issuance of paper money did much to facilitate mercantile
transactions, the big problem of small change persisted for consumers
until the standard formula was implemented. Before the adoption of
that formula, many jurisdictions were on a bimetallic standard of
coinage, silver and gold being the two most commonly used metals. In
Britain, the eighteenth century would begin with a small silver coin-the
shilling-as the unit of account. However, by the end of that century, a
gold coin-the guinea-would assume that role.' This was due in part to
the government's efforts in 1717 to set a ceiling on value at 21 shillings
per guinea, which went on to become the definition of the unit of
account in Britain.7 ' As Sargent and Velde observed, accepting this unit
of account put Britain on a de facto gold standard.79 The government's
75. Geva, supra note 33 at 146.
76. Scott, supra note 26 at 111.
77. Sargent & Velde, supra note 4 at 293.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
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main purpose in placing a ceiling on the value of the guinea was to
protect the tax revenue it received when it accepted gold at a high rate.8"
Monetary authorities in Britain began to neglect the supply of small
change during the eighteenth century, because of the prevalence of
privately issued tokens that were made possible by advances in minting
technologies. By stabilizing the exchange rate between the guinea and
subsidiary coinage, the British government set the stage for private firms
to issue token coinage that would be redeemable in gold-the single
standard of account.
The issuance of convertible token coinage displaced the notion of full-
bodied coinage based on intrinsic value, and it made fiat money more
acceptable in the eyes of the public. It also served to end coin
shortages;81 exchange rates between denominations were no longer a
consideration in the eyes of the public. This set the stage for the
government to nationalize private token coin production and fully
implement the standard formula along with the classical gold standard.
The Coinage Act of 181682 (also known as Liverpool's Act) proclaimed
gold coins to be the sole standard of value, and made silver coins
representative. Private coinage was made illegal one year later through
the Act of Suppression of 1817.83 By the end of the nineteenth century,
the standard formula had been implemented in all of the world's major
economies."
In the nineteenth century, Canada also anchored its monetary system
to gold.85 As in England, this was done by making the various forms of
currency convertible into the monetary standard, which in turn was
defined as a given quantity of gold of specified fineness.86 In 1871, the
80. Ibid
81. Ibid. at 303.
82. An Act to provide for a New Silver Coinage, and to regulate the currency of the Gold
and Silver Coin of this Realm, 1816 (U.K.), 56 Geo. III, c. 68.
83. An Act to prevent the issuing and circulating of Pieces of Copper or other Metal, usually
called Tokens, 1817 (U.K.), 57 Geo. Il, c. 46.
84. Sargent & Velde, supra note 4 at 318.
85. James Holladay, The Canadian Banking System (Boston: Bankers Publishing, 1938)
at 1.
86. Ibid.
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Uniform Currency Act 87 officially authorized a decimal currency for the
entire Dominion and made the sovereign of England and the eagle of the
United States legal tender, in addition to providing for a five-dollar
Canadian piece.88 That Act established the standard of value, which
consisted of 25.8 grains of gold that was nine-tenths fine and came to be
known as the dollar. It also proclaimed that the Currency of Canada
would consist of "dollars, cents and mills."89
While the issuing of coinage was fully nationalized by the
implementation of the standard formula, the issuing of banknotes
remained in private hands. This was the situation in Canada in the years
immediately after Confederation. Private banks issued notes in the form
of promissory notes made to the bearer. Those notes promised to
deliver, upon redemption, the face amount in coins or precious metal.
However, even under this regime, precious metals in the form of coins
continued to be the basis which underlay the money supply, and private
banks had to maintain a reserve of precious metals to meet the demands
of customers who wanted to redeem their notes. The same was true for
government mints.
II. The Canadian Money Supply in the Years
Following Confederation
A. Bank Regulation and Dominion Notes
It is important to observe that in the nineteenth century, note issuance
was considered to be one of the primary functions of banking.9" It was
the one certain resource for obtaining credit.9 Deposit taking as an
87. An Act to establish one Uniform Currencyfor the Dominion of Canada, S.C. 1871, 34
Vict., c. 4, ss. 1, 2, 6, 9.
88. Holladay, supra note 85 at 1.
89. Supra note 87, s. 2. A mill is one-tenth of a cent.
90. In 1833, the New York State Bank Commissioner said: "The legitimate use of banks
is not for the purpose of loaning capital, but for the purpose of furnishing currency to be
used instead of specie." Thomas Wilson, The Power "to Coin" Money: The Exercise of
Monetary Powers by the Congress (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) at 127.
91. Hepburn, supra note 65 at 145.
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instrument for extending loans became more prominent during the
nineteenth century. However, it had not yet totally displaced the use of
banknotes, 92  since individuals still preferred them as the most
convenient means of using loans in the circumscribed limits of trade at
that time."'
Issuing banknotes was a lucrative business for banks. They could
profit from the seigniorage that was derived from having what was in
effect an interest-free loan on coin and specie that their customers
exchanged for notes, a portion of which could then be lent out at a
profit. This was similar to their present-day use of funds deposited by
customers.94 As the standard formula was put into place and stability
was brought to smaller denominations, people began to shift their
attention to their savings in the form of larger denominations of
banknotes and deposits.
Banking in the United States proved to be very tumultuous, both in
terms of its viability and its role in larger debates on the role of
government intervention in general. However, the history of Canadian
bank regulation was very different. 9 For instance, Canadian authorities
did not have the anti-centralist tendencies displayed by U.S. authorities,
who preferred to discourage the establishment of large financial
92. Ibid. at 148.
93. Ibid. at 149.
94. Modern seigniorage has been explained as follows:
When an individual holds cash that he/she is not investing but rather is intending to
keep liquid so that he/she can meet their daily expenditure requirements, they are
obviously not earning any income on the cash they hold. The effect of this
development is that the holder is effectively lending money to the government at
zero interest, which is the economic equivalent of the government earning interest on
the cash it issues.
Thomas P. Vartanian, Robert Ledig & Lynn Bruneau, 21" Century Money, Banking and
Commerce (Washington: Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, 1998) at 492.
95. For a summary of U.S. banking and currency law history, see Ali Khan, "The
Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification" (1999) 67 U. Cin. L. Rev.
393; Arthur Nussbaum, A History of the Dollar (New York: Columbia University Press,
1957); Wilson, supra note 90; William J. Shultz & M.R. Caine, Financial Development of
the United States (New York: Prentice Hall, 1937); Hepburn, supra note 65; James Willard
Hurst, A Legal History of Money in the United States, 1774-1970 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1973).
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institutions by promoting independent local banks and granting charters
freely. Instead, Canadian authorities were more inclined to follow the
British model, and facilitated the emergence of branch banking.96
In a branch bank system, a network of branch offices is linked
together by a national organization.97 This is in contrast to a unit
banking system, where each "banking office" must remain a separate
institution.98 A branch banking system is believed to be more stable,
since its risks are automatically diversified as the branches make loans in
different geographical regions and to a wide variety of industries.99
Moreover, since branch banks have access to more resources than unit
banks, they can more readily make large-scale loans, which a unit bank
could only participate in as a part of a syndicate of lenders."
At the time of Confederation, branch banking proved to be a very
successful means of facilitating economic growth throughout the
country. Being a resource-based economy, Canada needed a banking
system that was adaptable and could easily respond to activities such as
agriculture, lumbering and fishing, all of which were highly seasonal in
their financing requirements. 1' The branch bank network made it easier
to transfer assets across the country in order to meet these seasonal
demands, which varied in their timing from one part of the country to
another. 2 Less capital and fewer skilled officers were needed to set up
branch banks than would have been needed to establish independent
banks in each location, and this helped to extend banking facilities into
more areas.1"3 Moreover, Canadian authorities were well aware of the
need to spread capital from large cities to rural areas. Experiences with
land banks in the United States fuelled the belief that a branch model
96. George S. Watts, "The Origins and Background of Central Banking in Canada"
(1972) Bank of Can. Rev. 15 at 16.
97. J.W. O'Brien, Canadian Money and Banking, 1st ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1964)
at 46-48.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Watts, supra note 96 at 16.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid. at 17.
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based on a few strong banks would avoid some of the pitfalls of the
American system."'
While note issuing privileges continued to be exercised by banks
following Confederation, important changes pertaining to Canada's
money supply began to take place. The federal government retained the
prerogative to manufacture all of Canada's coinage in a manner
consistent with the implementation of the standard formula. Before
Confederation, the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick
and Prince Edward Island had all experimented with government-issued
paper money at one time or another."' The federal government's
assumption of power over banking and currency was explicitly
recognized by the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly the British North
America Act, or B.N.A. Act),"06 and it was consistent with the economic
centralization envisioned by that Act.1"7
The B.N.A. Act gave the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over
"Currency and Coinage" in section 91(14),08 and also over "Banking,
the Incorporation of Banks and the Issuance of Paper Currency" in
section 91(15)."°9 These provisions might appear to treat the regulation
of currency generally as a matter distinct from the regulation of paper
currency in particular. Yet it must be borne in mind that the issuing of
paper currency was one of the primary functions of a bank at that time,
and judicial interpretation of section 91(15) widely endorsed the view
that it was intended to encompass those activities traditionally
associated with banking."0
104. Holladay, supra note 85 at 19.
105. James Powell, A History of the Canadian Dollar (Ottawa: Bank of Canada, 1999) at
9-11.
106. British North America Act, 1867 (U.K.), R.S.C. 1985, [B.NA. Act], ss. 91(14)-(20);
renamed the Constitution Act, 1867 by the Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. 1985, s. 53 (2).
107. William H. McConnell, Commentary on the British North America Act (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1977) at 205.
108. B.N.A. Act, supra note 106, s. 91(14).
109. Ibid., s. 91(15).
110. In the leading case on the meaning of this section-Tennant v. Union Bank of
Canada, [1894] A.C. 31 at 46-Lord Watson said:
The legislative authority conferred by these words is not confined to the mere
constitution of corporate bodies with the privilege of carrying on the business of
bankers. It extends to the issue of paper currency, which necessarily means the
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The federal government began to exercise many of its powers over
currency and coinage through the Dominion Notes Act.. of 1868, which
allowed it to issue its own notes backed by gold (called Dominion
notes). Despite periodic revisions, that Act remained substantively the
same and was put into its final form in 1914.112 Dominion notes were
issued in two distinct configurations and were primarily used for two
purposes.' Part of the issue was in notes of smaller denominations,
which were used as a hand-to-hand currency to fill the gap between the
largest coin (the fifty-cent piece), and the smallest banknote (five
dollars)." 4 Banks had previously been allowed to issue notes as small as
one dollar, but concerns from the Colonial Office"' that the currency
be founded on a "sound and metallic basis" required their withdrawal in
1870.116 At that time, the chartered banks voluntarily surrendered their
creation of a species of personal property carrying with it rights and privileges which
the law of the province does not, and cannot, attach to it. It also comprehends
"banking," an expression which is wide enough to embrace every transaction coming
within the legitimate business of a banker.
The House of Lords could have meant that the power to regulate the issuance of paper
currency was an ancillary power governed by s. 91(15). Yet this view would not accord
with the fact that currency is listed in another subheading. If the federal government had
the authority to regulate currency generally, why would it also need the power to
regulate paper currency? Lord Watson's statement on what constitutes banking would
seem to flow more logically if the issuance of paper currency were interpreted as a
function of banking. This view finds some support in Reference Re Alberta Legislation,
[1938] S.C.R. 100 at 115, where Duff C.J. held that s. 91 gave the federal government the
power to regulate credit, and differentiated between the power to regulate credit as a
.medium for effecting the exchange of goods and services, and the machinery for issuing
and circulating it."
111. 31 Vict., c. 46.
112. John D. Falconbridge, Banking and Bills of Exchange, 4th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law
Book, 1929) [Falconbridge 4th ed.] at 435. The 1914 Act can be found at R.S.C. 1927, c.
41.
113. Clifford A. Curtis, "The Canadian Monetary Situation" (1932) 40 J. Pol. Econ. 314
[Curtis, "The Canadian Monetary Situation"] at 316.
114. Ibid.
115. The Colonial Office was a British government department that was empowered to
revise or disallow colonial legislation, particularly that pertaining to banking and
currency. Mclvor, supra note 51 at 31.
116. Falconbridge 4th ed., supra note 112 at 434.
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right to issue notes under four dollars, in exchange for the abolition of
the tax of one percent per year on their note circulation and the repeal
of the statutory requirement that they hold one-tenth of their capital in
Dominion securities.1
17
The Dominion Notes Act made Dominion notes redeemable in specie
upon presentation to offices established in branches of the Receiver-
General in Montreal, Toronto, Halifax and St. John."' The Minister of
Finance was empowered to make arrangements with the chartered
banks for this purpose.'19 Specie had originally been limited to coins in
accordance with the standard formula, but it was extended in 1914 to
include bars that bore the stamp of specifically designated mints
certifying their weight and fineness. 2 ' Notes of the provinces were
declared to be obligations of the Dominion, and were redeemable in
gold when presented at the place where they were made payable.' 2 ' The
Act also made Dominion notes legal tender,'22 and mandated certain
reserve requirements in order to build public confidence in those
notes. 123 It authorized the issuing of a specified amount of notes that
were to be backed 25 percent by gold and 75 percent by government
securities (in the form of guaranteed debentures). 24 Any amounts issued
beyond these limits had to be backed 100 percent in gold. In 1870, the
limit was held at $9 million and was gradually increased to $50 million
in 1914.125
The second function of Dominion notes was as cash reserves for
commercial banks. 26 As Curtis observed, although Canadian banks had
never been required to carry any specified legal cash reserve, the Bank
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid. Additional offices were established in Charlottetown, Victoria and Winnipeg.
(Ibid at 435).
119. Ibid. at 434.
120. Holladay, supra note 85 at 12.
121. Ibid.
122. Dominion NotesAct, supra note 1121, s. 3.
123. Ibid., s. 5.
124. Ibid.
125. J.W. O'Brien & G. Lermer, Canadian Money and Banking, 2d ed. (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill, 1969) at 30.
126. Curtis, "The Canadian Monetary Situation", supra note 113 at 316.
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Act had always required that Dominion notes form at least 40 percent of
whatever cash reserves the banks actually carried in their vaults.'27
Moreover, Dominion notes were frequently issued in large
denominations in order to facilitate interbank clearing.128 The
Department of Finance would be responsible for the exchange of gold
for notes, and notes for gold.29
B. Private Banknotes
The demand for notes greater than five dollars was met by the private
banknote. It is important to note its particular legal characteristics. A
banknote was typically a promissory note payable to the bearer upon
demand, initially at a location printed on the note itself.1 30 Material
alterations invalidated the note, even though this did not affect the
underlying contract or promise to pay.' 3 ' However, as John
Falconbridge observed, the operation of section 145 of the Bills of
Exchange Act 132 waived such invalidity if the alteration was not apparent
and the note was acquired by a holder in due course. 131 Property in the
note would pass on delivery, and an individual who took it in good faith
and for value acquired title to it, even if it had been stolen from a former
owner. 34 Holders of banknotes were prima facie entitled to prompt
payment from the bank that had issued them. 35 However, private
banknotes were not generally considered to be legal tender in the same
way as Dominion notes, although, as discussed below, legislation
temporarily gave them this status at times.
Political wrangling over the role of private notes resulted in a
compromise. In March of 1870, the new Minister of Finance, Sir Francis
127. Ibid. See also Bank Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 12, s. 60.
128. Curtis, ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Falconbridge 4thed., supra note 112 at 139.
131. Ibid.
132. R.S.C. 1927, c. 16.
133. Falconbridge 4th ed., supra note 112 at 139.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid. Certain exceptions did exist, however. See ibid. at 139-140, citing Solomons v.
Bank of England (1791), 12 East 135n., 3 R.C. 634.
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Hincks, proposed that the federal government be granted the sole right
to issue them.'36 As had happened earlier in the former Province of
Canada, the proposal was withdrawn due to the opposition of banking
interests and adverse popular opinion.' Undeterred, however, the
Minister proceeded with a number of reforms. Determined to procure a
share of the profits that the banks derived from note issuance, he
proposed that the government alone should issue all notes below four
dollars, and he argued in favour of the reserve requirements outlined
above.13 Many of his views found expression in the Act respecting Banks
and Banking'39 of 1870 and in the Dominion Notes Act referred to above.
Sir Francis Hincks believed that any issuing of notes by the banks
should be done in a way that thoroughly protected the noteholders.
Experience with private notes in pre-Confederation Canada and the
United States demonstrated a tendency by some banks to make
imprudent loans and over-issue their notes. When this happened, they
lacked the resources to redeem outstanding notes, which circulated at a
heavy discount and often became worthless following a run on the
bank, with tremendous loss to noteholders.1
40
Thus, the Act provided that before issuing its own notes or
commencing operations, a bank had to have $500,000 of capital stock
bonafide subscribed and $100,000 bonafude paid up, with a further sum
of $100,000 to be paid up within two years after the commencement of
business.141 The Bank Act of 1871 provided that the amount of notes
intended for circulation, issued by a bank and outstanding at any time,
was not to exceed the amount of the bank's unimpaired paid-up
capital.142 No one other than a chartered bank was allowed to issue any
bill, note or other instrument that was intended to circulate as money or
be used as a substitute for money.'43
136. Falconbridge 4th ed., ibid., at 133.
137. Ibid. On previous governmental flirtations with central banking, see Powell, supra
note 105 at 6-11.
138. Falconbridge 4th ed., supra note 112 at 133.
139. 33 Vict., c. 11 [Bank Act 1871].
140. See generally Powell, supra note 105; Hepburn, supra note 65.
141. Falconbridge 4th ed., supra note 112 at 134-135.
142. Ibid at 135.
143. Ibid.
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One of the more interesting facets of the 1871 version of the Bank Act
was its provision for double liability. The Act stated that if a financial
institution declared insolvency, each shareholder would be liable for the
deficiency "to an amount equal to the par value of the shares held by
him, in addition to any amount not paid up on the shares." 144 Thus,
shareholders could be required to pay up to twice the face value of their
shares in the event of a failure.145 This provision was also extended to
render shareholders liable, below that ceiling, for any amount required
to satisfy the debts of the bank. 46 This was added primarily to protect
the interests of noteholders. 4 '
The decennial revision of the Bank Act in 1880 brought additional
measures designed to safeguard the interests of noteholders. Opposition
to Sir Francis Hincks' proposals subsided, and they were in the end
supported by the bankers themselves.'48 The reforms of 1880 gave
holders of an insolvent bank's notes a first charge (a prior lien) on the
assets of the bank. t49 This move was justified on the ground that
noteholders were involuntary creditors who, unlike depositors, had
little choice as to which bank liabilities they held. 5 ' As Falconbridge
noted, the privilege of note circulation brought easy and substantial
profit to the banks, so they looked favourably upon any measures that
would assure the banking public with respect to those notes.'
Yet this reform had its defects. Although the prior lien would make
payment almost certain, holders of a failed bank's banknotes would face
considerable delay, and would have to pay a discount, if they wished to
144. Bank Act 1871, supra note 139, s. 125, cited in Falconbridge 4th ed., ibid, at 342-
344.
145. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 31.
146. Falconbridge 4th ed., supra note 112 at 343.
147. O'Brien 2nd ed., supra note 125 at 31.
148. Falconbridge 4th ed., supra note 112 at 135.
149. Bank Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 12, s. 131.
150. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 32. Indeed, Sir Francis Hincks, Minister of
Finance, said ten years earlier that "if provision is made for the security of note holders,
the House will have done all it could in that direction, and it had no more to do with
depositors who, if they choose to deposit in a Bank, must do so at their own risk." House
of Commons Debates, (1870) at 219-221, cited in Patrick N. McDonald, "The B.N.A. Act
and the Near Banks: A Case Study in Federalism" (1972) 10 Alta. L. Rev. 155 at 177.
151. Falconbridge 4th ed., supra note 112 at 135.
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realize their notes at par immediately after a suspension. 1 2 Those who
were ignorant or unmindful of the operations of the Statute of
Limitations, and who did not present their outstanding notes for
redemption, would be unjustly injured.'53 In most cases, the notes of a
failed bank were not fully redeemed during the limitation period. The
1880 Act also failed to deal with a negative consequence of having a
privately issued currency, namely the fact that notes did not tend to
circulate at par in localities remote from the office where they were
payable, or in localities whose trade centre was different from that of
the issuing bank. Moreover, the Act's security requirements, in the form
of the amount of capital that was to be paid into a bank before it began
to operate, were considered inadequate for the protection of
noteholders.
Revisions to the Bank Act in 1890114 set about curing some of these
defects. The prior lien in favour of holders of notes outstanding at the
time of suspension was extended to cover interest owing.'55 Banks were
prohibited from pledging, assigning or hypothecating their notes, and
no loan made on the security of a bank's notes was to be recoverable
from the bank or from its assets. 56 Moreover, banks were required to
ensure the circulation at par in every part of Canada of all notes issued
or reissued by them and intended for circulation, and to this end, to
establish agencies for the redemption and payment of their notes in the
chief city of each province and at other places designated by the
Treasury Board. 5 ' Capital requirements for the establishment of new
banks were also raised."'S
152. Ibid at 136.
153. Ibid.
154. 53 Vict., c. 31 [Bank Act 1890].
155. Falconbridge 4th ed., supra note 112 at 136. See also Bank Act 1890, ibid., s. 53.
156. Falconbridge 4th ed., ibid. at 137. See also Bank Act 1890, ibid., s. 52.
157. Falconbridge 4th ed., ibid. See also Bank Act 1890, ibid., ss. 55-56.
158. Bank Act 1890, ibid, ss. 10 and 13. The 1890 revisions also established a bank
circulation and redemption fund, to provide for payment of notes on which the issuing
bank had defaulted. See Falconbridge 4th ed., ibid. at 147, and The Bank Act, R.S.C. 1927,
c. 12, [Bank Act 1927] ss. 64-66. Each bank contributed five percent of the amount of its
notes in circulation. If a bank suspended payment of its notes, and its liquidator did not
pay them within two months, the Minister of Finance could arrange for their payment,
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C. The Crisis of 1907
Rapid growth in the economy brought the system of private note
issuance to its limits by the early 1900's.' One will recall that a bank's
note issuance was restricted to the amount of its unimpaired paid-up
capital. Pressure was brought to bear on the money supply mechanism
during the crop-moving season, when demand for credit would reach its
peak.6 Deposit banking could not replace the need for more paper
money to keep pace with demand that was fuelled by the expanding
economy. 6 The year 1907 proved to be a bad one for both the wheat
and banking industries, as a low-quality wheat crop had to be moved to
market quickly to avoid deterioration. 62 At the time, however, demand
for notes was greater than their supply, and the banks could not provide
them fast enough to facilitate movement of the crop. 63 The crisis was
symptomatic of the larger issue of the inelasticity of the money supply
and the lack of rediscounting facilities164 available to the banks to meet
cash emergencies such as this one.
The limited rediscounting mechanisms that were available to the
banks were entirely in the form of funds that could be obtained from
with interest, out of the fund. If the amount paid out from the fund was more than the
insolvent bank had paid into it, the Minister could require the solvent banks to cover the
balance, not exceeding in any year one percent of the average amount of the notes of each
bank in circulation. If the insolvent bank repaid the excess to the fund, the contributing
banks would receive refunds.
159. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 33.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid
164. Ibid. at 116:
The older term 'rediscounting' arises from the manner in which the lender of last
resort function was originally performed in England. Discount houses bought or
'discounted' commercial acceptances in the normal course of business. When the
banks needed more funds, they called loans made to the discount houses, who, in
order to raise money, sold these acceptances outright to the central bank. Since this
was the second time that the same paper had been discounted, the term applied was
'rediscounting.' Under the current method the chartered banks borrow directly from
the Bank of Canada rather than sell assets to it, and pledge part of their securities
portfolio as collateral for the loan.
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abroad. Cash reserves in the system consisted primarily of gold and
Dominion notes redeemable in gold. 6 ' Added cash reserves could only
come from outside Canada by liquidating foreign call loans or
borrowing or selling securities, which frequently occurred in the New
York marketplace. The problem was compounded by the fact that at the
time, there were no active domestic bill or securities markets and no
liquid call loan markets.'66 These structural deficiencies hampered the
realization of assets needed to expand the money supply within the legal
limits.
The gold standard placed additional burdens on the money supply
mechanism. From 1854 to 1914, the Canadian dollar (as a unit of
account) was continuously on the gold standard,'67 so its value was fixed
in terms of gold. 6' There was virtually no scope for authorities to
conduct any sort of monetary policy. 69 Fluctuations around fixed values
were constrained by gold "import" and 'export" points, which marked
the exchange rates at which it was profitable for individuals to take
advantage of the price differential between official and market exchange
rates through importing and exporting gold."" An efflux of gold from
the economy would result in a restriction of credit domestically, with
the converse being true in the event of an influx.'7 ' The gold standard
was seen as beneficial, as it resulted in the maintenance of stable
exchange rates and kept the movement of domestic and international
price levels in harmony.'72
Banks in the financial system needed to maintain the gold standard, as
government took a hands off approach. Gold was needed by the banks,
not only to meet the domestic demand for cash but also to meet external
requirements. 17 When Canada sold securities in London or New York,
165. Curtis, "The Canadian Monetary Situation", supra note 113 at 316.
166. Courtland Elliott, "Bank Cash" (1938) 4 Can. J. Economics & Political Science 432
at 434.
167. Powell, supra note 105 at 14.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.
171. Macmillan Commission Report, supra note 54 at 58.
172. Ibid.
173. This section draws heavily from the Macmillan Commission Report, ibid. at 58.
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the proceeds of the loan were deposited in a branch of a Canadian bank.
Parts of the proceeds were used to purchase imports, and a large part
was used to finance domestic expenditures.'74 Accordingly, when
borrowers sold their London balance to a Canadian bank in exchange
for a deposit in Canada (which they could use to purchase Canadian
securities), the bank would increase its assets abroad and its deposit
liabilities in Canada. This was the means by which banks could increase
their reserves of foreign balances. The domestic deposit did not need a
100 percent reserve equal to the foreign balance, so the bank could use
the excess balance as it saw fit. Quite often, the proceeds were lent or
invested abroad, or brought to Canada in the form of gold. In either
case, the bank was left with an additional reserve asset that could
facilitate the further extension of credit. However, balances obtained
through a sudden increase in Canada's trade surplus, either through
added volume or an advance in prices, would also result in an expansion
of credit.
The system had, however, reached its limits in 1907, and it could not
provide for the expansion of credit needed to get the wheat crop to
market in time. To deal with the crisis, the federal government advanced
Dominion notes to the banks in sufficient quantities to meet the need.
175
The banks pledged securities against the advances, and the interest rate
rose in stages from four percent per year for the first 60 days to six
percent after four months so as to ensure prompt payment. 76
This experience led to amendments to the Bank Act in 1908,17 which
permitted a bank to issue extra notes in excess of its unimpaired paid-up
capital and reserve or rest fund, up to a maximum of 15 percent of that
total during the "usual" crop moving period from October to January of
each year. 78 If a bank wished to exercise this right, it had to give notice
to the Minister and to the President of the Canadian Bankers'
174. Ibid. at 58.
175. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 33.
176. Ibid.
177. An Act to Amend the Bank Act, 7-8 Edward VII, c. 7.
178. Ibid., s. 1(3). This excess was taxed, to ensure its prompt withdrawal. Ibid., s. 1(5);
O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 33.
M. Kianieff
Association (CBA).7 9 The CBA had been set up as a result of
amendments made in 1900. It was given responsibility for supervising
the note issuance of its members, 8 ' and it was also given the power to
appoint a curator to supervise the affairs of any bank that had suspended
redemption of its notes. 8 '
The solutions put forth in these amendments were short lived, as they
did not provide enough elasticity to allow the banks to respond to the
expansion of the Canadian economy.'82 In 1913, Parliament adopted a
different method of allowing the banks to issue excess notes. This
initiative permitted the banks to issue more notes at any time of year if
the excess issue was backed 100 percent by gold or Dominion notes held
in a Central Gold Reserve. 18 3
These reforms did not have the effect of increasing money supply
elasticity in the long run. As O'Brien and Lermer observed, their long
run impact was to tie note issuance more closely to the amount of gold
and Dominion notes held by the banks as demand for currency
increased.'84  This put additional strains on the money supply
mechanism that was in the hands of the banks by virtue of the gold
standard. The supply of Dominion notes themselves was restricted by
the government's gold holdings, with the end result that the money
supply could no longer respond to the needs of trade. 8 O'Brien and
Lermer went on to conclude that had the First World War not broken
out, Canada would inevitably have faced another currency crisis. 86
179. Supra note 177, s. 1(4).
180. The Bank Act Amendment Act 1900, 63-64 Vict., c. 26, s. 30(b).
181. Ibid., s. 24. A 1912 amendment extended the crop moving period for the purposes
of the Act from September 1 to February 28. The Bank Charters Continuation Act 1912, 2
George V., c. 5, s. 4.
182. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 33.
183. Ibid. See also The Bank Act 1927, supra note 158, s. 61(4). This reserve was in the
care of trustees, three of whom could be appointed by the Association with the approval
of the Minister, and a fourth by the Minister alone.
184. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 33.
185. Ibid. at 34.
186. Ibid.
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D. The Finance Act 1914
The First World War had profound consequences for the Canadian
economy as a whole187 because it created pressing needs that required a
fundamental change in the money-supply process. The beginning of the
war marked the end of the classical gold standard, as all major countries
suspended the convertibility of domestic banknotes into gold and the
free movement of gold between countries.88 With the outbreak of the
war and the suspension of the gold standard, individuals were not
always able to obtain information on international financial
developments. 8 9 Early in August of 1914, banks were faced with runs
throughout the country and with customers withdrawing gold in the
face of a general panic. 9 ' A means of reassuring the banking public had
to be devised to halt the runs. After a series of meetings between the
government and the CBA, 1 an order in council was issued, followed by
the passage of the Finance Act 1914,'92 which was meant to address the
crisis. Although the war had closed foreign markets to Canadian
securities, the Act provided a means by which credit could be extended
indefinitely without the requirement of the convertibility of banknotes
into gold.'93
The government had to devise a way to allow banks to meet their
obligations vis-a'-vis noteholders. The Finance Act could be proclaimed
in force by the Governor in Council during times of crisis. 94 The Act
made private banknotes legal tender, so that banks could meet depositor
demands with their own notes rather than Dominion notes or gold. 95 It
suspended redemption of Dominion notes in gold, coinciding with the
187. For the war's effects on the banks, see Clifford A. Curtis, "The Canadian Banks
and War Finance" (1931) 3 Contributions to Canadian Economics 7.
188. Powell, supra note 105 at 18.
189. Holladay, supra note 85 at 188.
190. Macmillan Commission Report, supra note 54 at 22.
191. Powell, supra note 105 at 18.
192. 5 Geo. V., c. 3.
193. Holladay, supra note 85 at 193.
194. Finance Act 1914, supra note 192, s. 4. A crisis was defined as "war, invasion, riot or
insurrection, real or apprehended, and.., any real or apprehended financial crisis."
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suspension of the gold standard. 196 To ensure that Dominion notes could
continue to be issued even in the absence of the gold standard, the Act
suspended the requirement in the Dominion Notes Act that additional
issues of notes in excess of $50 million be secured by an equivalent
amount of gold, and substituted eligible securities pledged by the
chartered banks in kinds and amounts approved by the Treasury
Board."" The Finance Act 1914 also extended the excess issue of private
banknotes during the crop-moving season to the entire year, 98 although
this provision was repealed in 1920.199
For the first time since Confederation, the Finance Act 1914 gave the
banks rediscounting facilities. It provided for the more elastic supply of
money needed to create the inflationary conditions that were used to
finance the war effort.2 °° Under section 4(a) of the Act, chartered banks
could "pledge" securities (approved by the Treasury Board) with the
Minister of Finance in return for an equivalent amount of Dominion
notes. The indefinite expansion of the Dominion note issue01 would
also allow for chartered bank reserves to be increased.20 2 In practice, the
banks bought government bonds to finance the war, then pledged them
under the Finance Act 1914 to build up cash reserves that they could
draw upon to buy more government bonds.2 3 The government would
then repay the banks from the proceeds of bonds sold to the public.2"4
Proceeds from those sales would be spent quickly by the government, so
liquid assets in the hands of the public mounted rapidly.0 ' The money
supply grew from a total of $480 million in 1914 to $874 million in
196. Ibid., s. 4 (d).
197. Ibid., s. 4 (a).
198. Ibid., s. 4 (c).
199. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 95.
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201. Thomas J. Courchene, "An Analysis of the Canadian Money Supply: 1925-1934"
(1969) 77 J. Pol. Econ. 363 at 365.
202. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 95.
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1918, and banknotes grew from 21.88 percent of the total in 1914 to
24.71 percent in 1918.206
Not surprisingly, the consumer price index rose by 55 percent during
the war, and the wholesale price index by 105 percent-twice the World
War UE increases. Unlike a traditional rediscount mechanism,
controlled by a central bank, the Finance Act 1914 could not unilaterally
adjust bank reserves in order to expand or contract the monetary base.20 '
Any advances made under that Act were solely at the request of
banks.2 °9
E. The Finance Act After the War
Following the War, Canada began to reorganize its finances and pave
the way for the eventual reinstatement of the gold standard that it
expected other countries would also carry out.210 Although the Finance
Act was initially conceived as a temporary war measure, it played a
more prominent role in the Canadian financial system in the years after
the war. It was extended in 1919 for two years, 211 then was revised and
made permanent in 1923.212 The 1923 Act retained the rediscounting
mechanisms of its predecessor, and empowered the Treasury Board to
fix the rate of interest and make regulations with regard to advances, the
deposit of securities and all other matters necessary to give effect to the
Act. 2
13
In the 1920s, the Treasury Board consisted of the Ministers of Finance
(chairman), Railways and Canals, Customs and the Interior, the
Postmaster General, and the Deputy Minister of Finance.2 14 Although
the Board had authority to set the advance rate of interest charged to the
banks for their borrowing, it did not use this power to control the
206. O'Brien, supra note 97 at 184.
207. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 96.
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expansion and contraction of credit.215 In the early 1920's that rate
consistently remained at five percent despite declining market interest
rates, and this had deflationary consequences. The stage was then set for
Canada's return to the gold standard in 1926.216 The Treasury
Board/Department of Finance arrangement was an attempt to bring a
sense of accountability to the operation of the Finance Act 1923, but the
Treasury Board's expertise was a far cry from what was needed to carry
out the functions traditionally associated with monetary policy
management by a central bank.
Canada returned to the gold standard, but this time with the Finance
Act firmly in place. That made it difficult to preserve the automatic
adjustment mechanism that had existed before 1914 to control credit.217
In 1928-1929, Canada experienced a boom that had grave repercussions
for its financial machinery. To quote from O'Brien and Lermer:
The operation of the Finance Act neutralized the adjustment mechanisms of the gold
standard. The price-specie flow mechanism required that when a country lost gold the
commercial banks would lose reserves and contract credit. This in turn would lower
prices, stimulate exports, and prevent further loss of gold. In Canada this did not happen.
The banks obtained gold for export by redeeming Dominion notes with the Department
of Finance, and then replaced their holdings of notes by borrowing under the Finance
Act. Their reserves did not fall and no credit contraction took place. The outflow of gold
continued and the gold reserves were depleted. At the beginning of 1929 the government
imposed an un-official embargo on the export of gold, enforced through the co-operation
of the banks. In fact, Canada left the gold standard at this time, although the embargo
was not made official until 1931.21
Indeed, most of the proceeds of the Finance Act borrowings by the
banks were invested in the form of call loans in New York during the
stock market boom of 1928-1929.219 However, this is not the only
215. Powell, supra note 105 at 19.
216. At this time, Dominion Notes were once again made redeemable in gold. Curtis,
"The Canadian Monetary Situation", supra note 113 at 322.
217. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 97.
218. Ibid. at 98. For a more technical discussion of these events, see generally Curtis,
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explanation given for the massive efflux of gold and securities to the
U.S. market. As James Holladay has pointed out, a bumper wheat crop
in 1928 required excess bank credit, which could only be supplied by the
banks through the use of the Finance Act.220 The Prime Minister stated
at the time that the government had exported some $40 million of gold
in late 1928 in order to meet its obligations abroad.22' In spite of these
explanations, it is clear that the existing financial machinery was
inadequate to provide a stabilizing force for the expansion and
contraction of credit.
Some relief came after the stock market crash of 1929 and the onset of
the Depression, which brought about lower price levels and modest
contractions in bank credit.222 As the Depression progressed, the
monetary system was again placed under strain, this time in the opposite
direction. Despite the major economic contraction that was underway,
the Treasury Board maintained the advance rate at 4.5 percent from
1928 to 1931.223 During this period, the banks repaid their advances
under the Finance Act, which in turn led to a monetary contraction that
exacerbated the economic downturn.224  However, the monetary
contraction did strengthen the Canadian dollar, which climbed from
US$0.80 in 1931 to US$0.90 in 1932.225
Faced with a deteriorating monetary position, the Treasury Board
finally decided to take a more proactive approach in October 1931. The
advance rate was reduced from 4.5 to 3 percent at a time when open
market rates were rising, then raised to 3.5 percent in May 1932-
considerably above the New York open market money rate but
considerably below the yields obtainable from short-term high-grade
Canadian securities. 226 Although the rates on Canadian bonds had their
220. Holladay, supra note 85 at 201.
221. Ibid.
222. Elliott, supra note 166 at 444.
223. Powell, supra note 105 at 26.
224. Ibid
225. Ibid. For a discussion of how various interests were affected by the monetary
policies of the day, and how they sought to influence those policies, see Donald V.
Smiley, ed., The Rowell-Sirois Report (Abridgement of Book 1) (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1963) at 168-169.
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most rapid rise on record in a single month in July 1932, bank condition
statements revealed no tendencies on the part of the banks to increase
their bond purchases. 227
Regardless of the favourable rates, many individual banks had been
reluctant to borrow reserves under the Finance Act 1923 even when their
own credit expansion possibilities were limited.228 Courtland Elliott
attributed this fact to the orthodox belief in the banking industry at the
time, that bank cash should only be acquired through the disposal of
other assets, and that any borrowing should be for a real emergency or
for a seasonal period and should be secured by self-liquidating
commercial paper.229
In November 1932, the federal government tried yet another means of
facilitating an easy money policy, to stimulate aggregate demand and
lower the value of the dollar with a view to stimulating exports. An
agreement was reached whereby all Canadian banks would acquire $35
million in Treasury Bills at a rate of four percent per annum, and would
pledge them under the Finance Act 1923 as collateral in exchange for
cash advances at a three percent rate.23 Once again these efforts were
ultimately futile.
Despite the Finance Act advances, the volume of bank credit and the
velocity of bank deposits continued to decline.2 1 The Canadian dollar
fell to a low of US$0.80, but the U.S. decision to prohibit the export of
gold in April 1933, coupled with a similar effort by that country to
reflate its economy, led the Canadian dollar to drift upward again.232 A
final attempt was made to expand credit under the existing machinery in
1934, when the government sought to expand the amount of Dominion
notes in circulation by reducing their gold backing to 25 percent. 233 The
measure had little effect on credit expansion; banks tended to retain the
increase in the Dominion note issue as additions to cash reserves, using
227. Ibid.
228. Ibid.
229. Ibid at 449.
230. Ibid.
231. Ibid.
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only marginal amounts for circulation or repayment of Finance Act 1923
obligations.234 The effect on the Canadian dollar was equally minute. It
returned to parity with its U.S. counterpart in 1934, and at times even
traded at a small premium.
235
III. The Complete Nationalization of the
Money Supply Mechanism
A. Initial Calls for Reform
The failure of the Canadian financial system to respond adequately to
the challenges of the Depression brought renewed scrutiny of its
operations. Popular discontent toward banking interests put increased
pressure on the government to take action.236 Initially, this pressure
focused on the fact that Canada lacked a money market, which would
have allowed it to manage its foreign exchange. Popular discourse
abounded with suggestions that Canada ought to "make" direct
exchange rates with the rest of the world, to prevent New York from
"making" such rates for Canada and therefore depreciating the Canadian
dollar. Ultimately, public demand to deal with this ailment took the
form of pressure for the establishment of a central bank.238
234. Elliott, supra note 166 at 451.
235. Powell, supra note 105 at 27.
236. Ibid.
237. Curtis, "The Canadian Monetary Situation", supra note 113 at 334.
238. Indeed, the July 1, 1933 edition of Maclean's Magazine read:
The point which our bankers seem to miss is that what the Canadian people want in
a central bank is not to supply the other banks with rediscount facilities which they
already have or to save us from future panics [as, it is previously noted, U.S.
experience showed that they did not], but they do want an institution that will
effectively control the whole of the money and credit of the nation, now under the
control of the other banks and which will somehow be able to make that money and
credit available in sufficient volume wherever legitimately needed, and on terms
much more fair and equitable than at present.
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Michael Bordo and Angela Redish concluded that much of the impetus
for a central bank came from practical political considerations.239 Banks
had become an attractive political target, due to the concentrated nature
of the industry. In 1930, Canada was left with ten banks, three of which
owned 75 percent of the industry's assets.2" The CBA was seen as a
forum for collusion, and itself admitted that collusion had played a part
in such matters as western bank closures.241 Political forces were
gathering momentum through the Social Credit and Progressive parties,
which had championed the cause of farmers hurt by the banks' failure
to extend credit and expand their note issuance.242
It was only a matter of time before the matter came to the attention of
Prime Minister R.B. Bennett. Canada was in the midst of a depression,
and people began to look to government for solutions in the face of
market failures to stimulate aggregate demand. The Prime Minister
declared the following in December 1933:
I learned to my surprise that there was no direct means of settling international balances
between Canada and London, that the only medium was New York, and the value of the
Canadian Dollar would have to be determined in Wall Street. I made up my mind then
and there that this country was going to have a central bank because there must be some
financial institution that can with authority do business for the whole of the Dominion
with the other nations of the World. If Canada was to be financially independent there
had to be a means of determining balances, of settling international accounts; and a
central bank would furnish this.243
The passage is cited by Bordo and Redish as evidence that the Prime
Minister had decided a priori that a central bank should be created, even
before any recommendations to that effect were made by the Royal
Commission on Banking and Currency in Canada, discussed below. 244
Bordo and Redish concluded that the decision was made independent of
239. Michael D. Bordo & Angela Redish, "Why Did the Bank of Canada Emerge in
1935?" (1987) 47J. Econ. History 405 at 415.
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any economic considerations, or as an outgrowth of the existing
financial architecture.
However, the historical record suggests that political considerations
provide an incomplete explanation for the genesis of central banking in
Canada. As we have seen, the inability of the private sector to
adequately address credit concerns of consumers had compelled the
federal government to intervene several times since Confederation.
Inadequacies in the system not only brought the issue to the public's
attention, but also to the attention of scholars. George Watts pointed
out that much of the initial impetus for the establishment of a central
bank came from the Queen's University Department of Economics. 24
While calls for such a bank had been made from Confederation to the
1920s, Watts credited that university department, and Professor Clifford
A. Curtis in particular, with making the idea more relevant in the face
of the inadequacies of the Finance Act 1923 outlined above.246 Unlike the
Prime Minister, Curtis, writing in 1932, did not advocate the
establishment of a Canadian money market.247 What he did suggest was
that the Canadian financial system needed a radical restructuring, and
that Canada needed a "Macmillan Report" of its own.248
The original Macmillan Report was named after Lord Macmillan, 249 an
eminent jurist who had chaired the U.K. Commission on Finance and
Industry,211 of which John Maynard Keynes was a member. 2 1 That
Commission had held hearings from 1929 to 1931 in response to charges
that the interests of industry and trade in the U.K. had been sacrificed to
245. Watts, supra note 96 at 21.
246. Ibid.
247. "Wiser counsels prevailed," Curtis said, "and the suggestion was deemed
'impractical' for the time being." Curtis, "The Canadian Monetary Situation", supra note
113 at 334.
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250. Watts, supra note 96 at 23.
251. In his memoirs, Lord Macmillan expressed much admiration for Keynes, and
confessed his own discomfort in comprehending the intricate details of finance. Lord
Macmillan attributed much of the technical material in his report to a drafting sub-
committee, of which he described Keynes as having been the "leading spirit." Lord Hugh
P. Macmillan, A Man of Law's Tale: The Reminiscences of the Rt. Hon. Lord Macmillan
(London: Macmillan, 1952) at 196-197.
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those of the financial community.2 The Commission is known for
having proposed a significant role for central banking," 3 and although
its recommendations were largely seen as being on the cautious side,... it
set several precedents. Chief among them was the fact that for the first
time, the operations of what was then a private entity-the Bank of
England-were subjected to public scrutiny."5 The Commission's report
revealed the Bank of England's previously secret inner workings,256 and
that Bank thereafter disclosed more information to the public.25 7
Moreover, Keynes had taken a leading role in recommending a more
proactive role for the Bank, to counter the effects of unemployment
through expansionary monetary policy designed to increase bank
reserves and facilitate credit.258
One can only imagine Curtis's delight when Prime Minister Bennett,
after a visit to England in 1933, asked Lord Macmillan himself to head a
Royal Commission on Banking and Currency in Canada.259 In his
memoirs, Lord Macmillan recalled that Bennett "would take no refusal
from me and insisted on my going out to Canada. "260
B. The Canadian Macmillan Commission
The Canadian Macmillan Commission 261 had as its mandate to study
the functioning of the Finance Act and to consider the advisability of
252. R.S. Sayers, The Bank of England 1891-1944, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1976) at 360.
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establishing a central bank.262 The Commission began its hearings in
August 1933 and issued its final report a mere seven weeks later, on
September 28.263 In their submissions to the Commission, the banks
maintained that a central bank was unnecessary, and that all that was
needed was an administrative board to supervise the operation of the
Finance A ct.26 The bankers balked at the suggestion that a central bank
might be desirable to facilitate the establishment of a Canadian money
market. They felt that such a market would be "artificial" and could
never have the vitality of the London Bill Market, which they described
as a "natural growth." 2
61
With respect to the banks' note-issuing privileges, the bankers warned
of dire consequences should they be lost. M.W. Wilson, General
Manager of the Royal Bank of Canada, claimed that the closure of bank
branches in small communities would result,266 since banks could no
longer concentrate their reserves at central points and use their own
unissued notes as the cash reserves of their smaller branches.267 The
situation, Mr. Wilson said, would be aggravated by the fact that banks
would also lose a significant source of revenue from issuing notes
(estimated to yield 1.5 percent of their average circulation after taxes).268
He submitted that it would not be necessary to give the proposed
central bank the sole right to issue notes, and that private banknotes
ought to remain in place even if such a bank were established.269
The Commission was not persuaded by the bankers' predictions. It
voted to recommend a central bank by a margin of three to two, with
the two bankers dissenting. 270 The Commission explicitly rejected the
suggestion that Canada's economy was too underdeveloped to support
262. Macmillan Commission Report, supra note 54 at 5.
263. Powell, supra note 105 at 28.
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central banking in the way that the U.K. and the U.S. had .1 7 To quote
Lord Macmillan:
The financial system and economic life of Canada are already sufficiently well developed
to make the instruments of the discount rate, the purchase and sale of securities, and
operations in the foreign exchange market, of sufficient importance in the hands of a well
managed central bank to give it a decisive influence on the credit situation in Canada
27
1
These were seen as effective tools that would enable a central bank to
fulfil its mandate, which the Commission saw as having three
components: to regulate credit and currency, both domestically and in
the foreign exchange market;2 73 to co-operate with other central banks
and the Bank for International Settlements, in order to mitigate
fluctuations in the general level of economic activity; 7 4 and to dispense
skilled and impartial financial advice to the government of the day, with
a primary goal of community service rather than profit maximization.
7 5
The banks' claim that issuing notes was not a necessary function of a
central bank was also explicitly rejected. The sole right to issue legal
tender notes, the Commission said, "is essential for the full and
satisfactory working of a central bank."2 76 It was seen as complementary
to the essential powers of maintaining bank reserves, holding various
government accounts and carrying out all major governmental financial
transactions. 277 To the bankers' claim that a transfer of note issuing
privileges would greatly disrupt the economy, the Commission argued
that this should not happen if the transfer was spread over a suitable
period.278
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C. Establishment of the Bank of Canada
Interestingly enough, both the Bennett Conservative government and
the Liberal opposition led by Mackenzie King had originally opposed
the establishment of a central bank.279 Yet mounting political opinion to
the contrary, coupled with the rise of the Social Credit and Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation parties in the west, made a central bank a
more attractive political option.28 ° The Macmillan Commission Report
was tabled on September 27, 1933, and the government indicated that it
was willing to accept the Commission's recommendations on
November 20, 1933, one week after they were made public.28 '
In June of 1934, An Act to Incorporate the Bank of Canada28 2 received
Royal Assent. The preamble stated that the Bank's purpose was to
regulate credit and currency in the best interest of the economic life of the nation, to
control and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate by
its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and
employment, so far as may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and
generally to promote the economic and financial welfare of the Dominion.
The Bank of Canada was slated to commence operations on March 11,
1935.283 In keeping with the Macmillan Commission's
recommendations, provisions were made for the gradual phasing out of
private note issues. By proclamation dated March 7, 1935, three
repealing statutes took effect when the Bank began to operate.284 They
repealed the Dominion Notes Act,285 the Act respecting certain issues of
279. O'Brien & Lermer, supra note 125 at 99.
280. Ibid. at 100.
281. Watts, supra note 96 at 26.
282. 24-25 George V, c. 43 [Bank of Canada Act].
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Dominion Notes,286 and the Finance Act 1923.287 The Bank of Canada was
given the responsibility to redeem all outstanding Dominion Notes,288
to be replaced with the Bank's own notes which were made legal
tender.289
Other changes to the Bank Act repealed the banks' authority to issue
excess notes during the crop-moving period.29 Issues were once again
limited to the amount of a bank's unimpaired paid-up capital. Beginning
in 1936, the limit was reduced by five percent each year for five years,2 1
and then by ten percent for each of the following five years, so that by
1945 it was down to 25 percent of paid-up capital.292 In 1944, banks were
prohibited from any further issue or reissue of chartered banknotes.293
On January 1, 1950, the banks paid the Bank of Canada a cash sum
equal to the notes still outstanding,294 and the Bank of Canada assumed
responsibility for them. Also in 1950, double liability on bank stock,
initially enacted as a consumer protection measure, expired. 295 The era
of private banknotes had ended.
IV. Did Nationalization Make a Difference?
In their 1987 article, Bordo and Redish argued that the Bank of Canada
had little impact on macroeconomic variables. 296 They used an
econometric analysis to test whether any changes had occurred in the
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money stock, price levels and exchange rates in the period after the
advent of the Bank of Canada in March 1935. They found that there was
no structural break at that point,29' and they concluded that political
forces played a larger role in the establishment of the Bank than
298economic ones.
A number of facts appear to be inconsistent with Bordo and Redish's
conclusions. To be sure, and as the historical record bears out, political
considerations did play a large role in the establishment of the Bank of
Canada and in the consequent demise of private banknotes. However,
the Bank did not have complete control over the money supply until
1950, when its notes became the sole circulating medium. Provision also
had to be made for the accumulation of central reserves by the Bank
before it could effectively engage in monetary policy. As a result, it is no
surprise that the Bank had only a marginal effect on macroeconomic
variables as of the day it commenced operations. However, this does not
necessarily mean that it had no effect at all on subsequent events.
Bordo and Redish also failed to consider the fact that central banking
was a relatively new phenomenon in Canada, and that it would take the
Bank of Canada some time to master many of the tasks typically
performed by a central bank. The Bank's first Governor was Graham
Towers, 299 formerly Assistant General Manager of the Royal Bank of
Canada (one of the banks that had supported the Bank of Canada's
creation) and someone who was well respected in the banking
community."° The Deputy Governor was J.H.C. Osborne, Secretary of
the Bank of England, who was on loan to the Bank until 1938.301 The
excellent credentials of these people notwithstanding, the Bank's staff
needed time to acquire enough credibility in the eyes of other bankers
to be able to influence their operations through moral suasion. This
point had been made in bankers' submissions to the Macmillan
Commission,30 2 and it was not lost on the commissioners themselves.
30 3
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As Bordo and Redish indicated, the annual reports of the Governor of
the Bank of Canada from 1935 to 1939 cited concerns that there had
been a transfer to the Bank of elements of the former financial system
rather than an endeavour to achieve a proactive macroeconomic
agenda. 3° Yet one must remember that the establishment of the Bank of
Canada was intended to eliminate structural deficiencies in the former
system, not in the short run but in the long run. The Bank was certainly
not seen as a panacea that would halt any variations in Canada's
economic fortunes,"' but it was hoped that it would bring a sense of
stability and would mitigate economic fluctuations. This role is clearly
expressed in the Bank of Canada Act preamble set out above.
After its operations began, the Bank of Canada was credited with an
increase in the demand for currency.3 6  It also brought about
improvements in chartered bank investment positions, by providing
sufficient reserves to assure the absorption of government issues at a
pace synchronized with the government's financial requirements.0 7
Through its day-to-day dealings in securities and foreign exchange, the
Bank provided an auxiliary market that minimized price fluctuations
that might have been accentuated by temporary changes in the Bank's
financial position.0 8 Canada would thenceforth be on a managed money
basis,309 no longer constrained by a lack of cash reserves. 3 ° The banking
system became free to acquire assets, and no longer faced the legal
requirements to dispose of them that it had faced under the previous
regime.311
The demise of private note issuance had important ramifications for
the development of the monetary system. The banks were relieved of
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their responsibility to maintain Canada's foreign exchange position, and
no longer had to worry about the acceptability of their note issues.
Those responsibilities were consolidated in the Bank of Canada, which
could exploit increasing returns to scale and had the full force of the
country's gold reserves behind it. People no longer had to worry that
the money in their pockets might become worthless overnight, as the
Bank of Canada banknote had the guarantee of government behind it.
Even more important, by assuming the power to issue notes, the Bank
of Canada markedly improved the availability of credit. As was
mentioned earlier, the money supply could now be expanded or
contracted in a number of ways which the private system could not
hope to emulate. Through the use of open market operations, the
money supply could be adjusted to suit economic needs. When the Bank
wished to decrease the size of the money supply, and hence encourage
the chartered banks to contract credit, it could sell some of its bond
holdings to them. The banks would pay with bank drafts which the
Bank of Canada would cash by decreasing the banks' accounts with it,
thereby reducing the monetary base and the reserves backing the banks'
ability to lend.312 The converse was true when the Bank of Canada
wished to increase the money supply. In that event, it would buy
securities from the chartered banks or the public, pay for them with
bank drafts and deposit the proceeds with the banks, which they would
then be free to lend.313 Reserves could also be adjusted by direct deposits
or withdrawals to or from Bank of Canada accounts at the chartered
banks.
Conclusion
Despite its promising beginnings, the issuing of private bank notes in
Canada came to be seen as an inauspicious experience. Why did it fail to
surmount the hurdles it faced? One answer lies in the fact that laws
prevented the banks from supplying adequate amounts of money or
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credit when the situation warranted it, as had happened in 1907. Those
laws were implemented in response to experiences in the United States
and pre-Confederation Canada that had shaken the public's confidence
in the ability of banks to redeem their obligations. Controls on note
issuance were seen as a vital means of preventing bank failures, by
ensuring that such issuance did not deplete a bank's resources and leave
it unable to function as a going concern. Although those regulations
were necessary if the system was to remain stable, they had the effect of
aggravating economic booms and downturns, and they ultimately
proved to be unreliable in extending credit in times of adversity.
The onset of the First World War only made matters worse for the
financial system. The circumstances leading to the Finance Act showed
that the existing system of private note issuance was inadequate to meet
the economic needs of the country. Yet the solution envisioned by that
Act only served as an incentive to the banks to disconnect themselves
from the gold standard, and did not have the effect of expanding credit
in the face of the Depression. The lack of expertise in the Treasury
Board's management of the Finance Act only served to erode the public's
confidence in the financial system as a whole. In Courtland Elliott's
words:
It seems to me only natural that in a period of unprecedented depression with its
alteration of values, reduction of income, and social distress a demand would arise for
monetary panaceas. It may be an illusion but it is a species of logic for an articulate public
opinion, aware that a War of destruction and an era of speculation can be financed in a
period of fifteen years, to demand that poverty in the midst of plenty be abolished by
monetary means.3
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The market approach had failed in this instance, and politicians,
citizens and even some bankers once again turned to the state in search
of a remedy. Political considerations undoubtedly played a large role in
the ultimate choice of a course of action. Although private note issuance
had served Canada well in its first half century, the economic benefits
derived from it had failed to keep pace with the growing needs of the
economy. When reforms within the existing system could no longer
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provide a solution, a systemic change was inevitable. In the result, the
Bank of Canada, whatever its shortcomings, has stayed true to its
mission and has helped mitigate economic swings, at least with respect
to meeting the demand for currency in the face of financial challenges.
With the end of private note issuance, Canada (and indeed the rest of
the world) had come full circle. The development of the standard
formula demonstrated that government had to take a proactive role in
curing the failure of the market to supply adequate amounts of small
change. Despite partial governmental interventions, a complete solution
was not found until government obtained a monopoly over coin
issuance. The same would ultimately prove to be the case with respect
to private banknotes.
More importantly, the story of private banknotes in Canada
demonstrates how money and credit have evolved, and illustrates the
qualitative change in the nature of paper currency. From goldsmiths'
notes and on to the first banks of issue, the precursors to banknotes
emerged in Europe as a means of furnishing a workable currency and
extending credit. We then witness the importation of banknotes into
Canada as a replacement for bons. They served as the backbone for the
loan activities of chartered banks, and they finally became an obligation
issued by the Bank of Canada itself. This latter development reflected a
change in attitude from a quantitative perspective as well. Not only did
government retain the prerogative to determine the quality of money,
which it had enjoyed since the implementation of the standard formula,
but it thenceforth also played a role in determining the quantity of
money.
In assessing the desirability of institutional reforms, one must remain
aware of the tradeoffs that arise from competing systems. Hayek
envisioned a system that would curb what he perceived to be
governmental excesses, but the system he envisioned closely resembled
that which preceded the present one. In charting a course for the future,
we must look back on the roads previously travelled, so that we may
learn from past mistakes. The form of money has changed, and will
undoubtedly continue to change; for example, the decades since the
demise of the private banknote have seen the emergence of travellers'
cheques, credit cards and electronic money. Policymakers and academics
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must find ways to redesign and modify institutions to meet present and
future needs. In doing so, they should be attentive to history's lessons.
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